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Abstract 
 
 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Real-time Adversarial 
Intelligence and Decision-making (RAID) program is investigating the feasibility of “reading the 
mind of the enemy” – to estimate and anticipate, in real-time, the enemy’s likely goals, 
deceptions, actions, movements and positions. This program focuses specifically on urban battles 
at echelons of battalion and below. The RAID program leverages approximate game-theoretic 
and deception-sensitive algorithms to provide real-time enemy estimates to a tactical 
commander. A key hypothesis of the program is that these predictions and recommendations will 
make the commander more effective, i.e. he should be able to achieve his operational goals safer, 
faster, and more efficiently. Realistic experimentation and evaluation drive the development 
process using human-in-the-loop wargames to compare humans and the RAID system. Two 
experiments were conducted in 2005 as part of Phase I to determine if the RAID software could 
make predictions and recommendations as effectively and accurately as a 4-person experienced 
staff. This report discusses the intriguing and encouraging results of these first two experiments 
conducted by the RAID program. It also provides details about the experiment environment and 
methodology that were used to demonstrate and prove the research goals. 
 
Introduction 
 
 The Information Exploitation Office (IXO) of the DARPA is conducting a research 
project titled, RAID [1,2], to investigate the feasibility of “reading the mind of the enemy” – to 
estimate and anticipate, in real-time, the enemy’s likely goals, deceptions, actions, movements 
and positions. A particular focus of the program is tactical urban operations against irregular 
combatants – an especially challenging and operationally relevant domain. The predictions and 
estimates can be provided to a commander via simple electronic map overlays. Given these 
timely predictions and estimates, the commander should then be able to conduct and modify his 
movements and tactics (course of action) during execution to achieve fewer casualties, faster 
completion of tasks, and more efficient use of resources. The development schedule for the 
RAID program is three 1-year phases. Two experiments conducted in 2005 measured the Phase I 
progress toward improving command effectiveness and yielded some intriguing and encouraging 
results regarding our ability to anticipate and predict a live enemy force in an urban environment. 
There is statistically significant evidence that the RAID predictions are as accurate and as 
effective as (and even on average more effective than) those of a 4-person experienced staff. 
When given RAID predictions and recommendations, the commander was more effective in 
accomplishing his given mission as measured by operational metrics, such as time to complete, 
blue and red casualties, and other mission-specific parameters. 
 The RAID program leverages approximate game-theoretic and deception-sensitive 
algorithms to build predictive analysis tools that provide real-time enemy estimates to a tactical 
commander. In doing so, the RAID program is addressing two critical technical challenges: (a) 
adversarial reasoning: the ability to continuously identify and update predictions of likely enemy 
actions [3]; (b) deception reasoning: the ability to continuously detect likely deceptions in the 
available battlefield information. Although many types of military operations can greatly benefit 
from these capabilities, the RAID program is focusing on an intentionally narrow but still very 
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challenging domain: the in-execution, tactical combat of largely dismounted infantry (supported 
by armor and air platforms) against a guerilla-like enemy force in an urban terrain. Realistic 
experimentation and evaluation are driving the development process using human-in-the-loop 
wargames to compare humans and the RAID system. The Army OneSAF Testbed (OTB) 
wargame is the combat simulation system and is operated with live players controlling both the 
enemy (red) and the friendly (blue) forces. The products being developed by the RAID program 
are being evaluated for potential transition to battle command systems and military intelligence 
systems. 
 This paper discusses the motivation for the experiments and then provides a system 
overview followed by an explanation of the experiment design and operational scenarios used to 
measure the capabilities of the RAID system. Also provided is a discussion of the specific output 
products of the RAID system, such as predictions, recommendations, estimates of enemy goals 
and attitudes, identification of deceptions, anticipation of enemy movements, and suggestions for 
friendly countermoves. Finally, this paper reviews the outcome of the experiments and provides 
insights into the development and transition plans of the program. 
 
Motivation and Objectives of the Experiments  
 
The objective of the RAID experiments is to explore the ability of RAID to make 
effective estimates of enemy actions and assumptions about friendly counteractions (move-
countermove reasoning), as compared to a human staff. The experiments are not meant to 
replicate any existing staffing structure or command organization, but to measure the predictive 
capability of the software algorithms and compare the products to the predictive capability of a 
very experienced group of soldiers. In the experiments, RAID performs both intelligence and 
operational functions. First, it reads the enemy/friendly situation from the Combat Simulation 
System. For these Phase I experiments, situational information, such as location, strength, 
orientation and movement, was available in real-time and was 100% accurate and complete. 
Second, it accepts guidance from the blue commander (priorities, key objectives, etc.) and uses 
that information in its calculations. Third, it estimates, on demand, the most effective actions of 
enemy and assumed actions of blue for the next X minutes of wargame time. For these Phase I 
experiments, the estimates were for the next 30 minutes. Fourth, it completes every new estimate 
rapidly. In fact, portions of the algorithms run continuously in the background and give alerts as 
needed. Finally, the RAID system presents the estimate to the blue commander as overlay 
graphics or two or three dimensional (2D/3D) animations. The human staff performs these same 
functions and shares their data through an electronic whiteboard. 
In addition to the comparative analysis, another objective of the experiments is to 
measure the performance parameters of the system. The specific parameters and goals of interest 
for each phase of the program are shown in Table 1. These first two experiments used Phase I 
goals. The look ahead into the future was a continuum of position, movement and firing 
predictions from 0-30 minutes. The problem complexity was calculated to be 10**10,700 for the 
types of scenarios and missions used in these experiments. For solution speed, the maximum 
time needed to calculate a new prediction was 300 seconds and the average was a 120 seconds. 
For the key goal, RAID had a higher average operational score than the human staff and beat the 
human staff in 11 of 18 paired runs. The RAID system was also more accurate in predicting the 
future locations of enemy forces and faster in identifying operationally pertinent phenomena than 
the human staff. 
4 
Overview of RAID System 
 
 A simplified block diagram of the 
RAID system is depicted in Figure 1 showing 
the two major components of the RAID 
system – the Adversarial Reasoning Module 
(ARM) and the Deception Reasoning Module 
(DRM). Also shown is the Combat Simulation 
System which is used to simulate the 
battlefield and the information flows. There 
are two major inputs to the RAID system, 
battlefield models and situational information. 
The battlefield models include internal models 
of the terrain (3-D terrain data to include 
doors, windows, floors, and other details of 
the landscape); internal models of enemy and 
friendly resources (weapons parameters to 
include range, lethality, probabilities of 
acquisition/kill/damage/injury and vehicle or 
platform parameters to include min/max/avg 
speeds, vulnerability to specific weapons); and internal models of tactics and courses of action 
(to include influence of goals and objectives (speed, safety, success) on the selection of tactics). 
Situational information includes enemy and friendly force strength, location, and movement and 
is comprised of intelligence data from both Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and 
updates from deployed sensors and operational data from both mission planning and operational 
reports from the deployed forces. Because the RAID system is designed for a future battlefield 
environment, it expects the situational data in a machine-readable format and does not work with 
voice or text-based sitreps, raw sensor feeds, or other unique reporting formats. For 
experimentation purposes, there is a translator between the Combat Simulation System and the 
RAID system which filters and translates the simulation data to provide the desired data stream 
RAID-assisted small 
staff scores as high 
as large unassisted
RAID-assisted small 
staff scores as high 
as large unassisted
RAID-assisted small 
staff scores as high 
as large unassisted
Key Goal
Within 30 secWithin 120 secWithin 300 secSolution 
speed
over 10*50,000over 10**20,000over 10**8,000Problem 
Complexity
At least 5 hoursAt least 60 minAt least 30 minLook Ahead 
Into Future
Phase 3Phase 2Phase 1
Table 1.  RAID Program Experiment Goals by Phase. 
Phase I was completed in 2005 and Phase II development is in progress.  In 
addition to the increasing difficulty of the metrics in each phase, the 
scenarios and operational parameters also become more realistic. 
Figure 1. RAID System Diagram. 
The two major components of the RAID system 
are the Adversary Reasoning Module and the 
Deception Reasoning Module.  Although, the 
Combat Simulation System is not a part of the 
RAID system, it is integral to the development 
and testing. 
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to the RAID components. The output of the RAID system consists of enemy predictions and 
friendly recommendations and are discussed in detail later. 
 The ARM is responsible for generating predictions of the enemy actions and assumptions 
about the friendly actions, either on-demand or in response to battle situation changes. As 
information regarding the battlefield situation (locations, strengths, postures, actions, etc.) of 
enemy and friendly troops becomes available or changes, either in the deliberate IPB and 
wargaming mode or during the execution of the operation, the ARM generates a new or modified 
set of predictions, including most dangerous and most likely prediction, each characterized by its 
likelihood. The ARM has two major subcomponents: one focuses on predicting the emotional 
state and intent of the enemy and the other focuses on the physical locations and movements of 
the enemy.  
 The DRM is responsible for identifying probable enemy deceptions, decoys, feints, and 
concealed enemy assets, movements and actions within the currently available information. The 
DRM provides the ARM with probable locations and concentrations of unseen enemy assets for 
use in the ARM calculations and provides alerts to the user or commander regarding decoys, 
feints or possible ambushes that represent near-term threats. While continually observing the 
evolution of the battlefield and the evolution of the predictions made by the ARM, the DRM 
continually updates itself and infers possible concealed enemy force elements or movements of 
elements, incorrectly identified enemy assets, decoys, actions designed to mislead friendly 
forces, etc.  
 The core of the experimentation testbed is the Combat Simulation System, which is based 
on the proven Army simulation and training system, OTB. Certain modifications to the existing 
system’s interfaces and entity behaviors have been implemented to meet the needs of RAID 
experimentation. Both friendly and enemy teams of entities are controlled by human ‘players’ 
that can freely control movement, placement, and orientation. For the most part entity control is 
at the team level and not at the individual entity level. Fires are automated actions with the 
simulation system calculating the line-of-sight to determine if weapons are fired and using 
probability tables to determine degree and amount of effect or casualties. Although the 
simulation system is not a part of the RAID system under development, it is a critical component 
for exercising the operational functionality of the RAID components. The simulation system is 
used by the technology developers as a means of observing and learning both friendly and enemy 
capabilities and tactics. Finally, the simulation system is used to measure and demonstrate the 
performance characteristics of the RAID system. 
 
Experimental Methodology 
 
The basic premise of the RAID experiment methodology is to compare the performance 
of a commander using RAID (test games) against a commander without RAID, but supported by 
a small staff of human experts (benchmark games). A tactical commander at this level of 
command (below battalion) would not typically have a dedicated staff to help him during the 
real-time execution of an urban battle, but in order to measure the accuracy and value of the 
RAID system, the experiment commander is provided with a staff of two operational experts and 
two intelligence experts. During the benchmark games, this staff provides the same kind of 
predictive products that are produced by RAID. Thus comparative measurements can be made 
with regard to prediction accuracy, timeliness, and completeness as well as benefit to the 
commander’s success (mission accomplishment). Each game lasted about 2 hours (preceded by 
6 
an orientation and planning session) and Figure 2 illustrates the setup used for the experiments. 
Forces were tasked and controlled as teams and not as individual soldiers. The wargame players 
each controlled 5-6 teams and used tasks (which translate to a series of automated behaviors in 
the simulator) to move and command their forces.  The friendly forces had five Strykers, which 
were managed by one player and controlled individually.  
Control of the enemy team entities was performed by a red cell of five experienced 
human wargamers who are trained in the typical tactics of urban insurgents. The red cell 
consisted of a red commander and four operators who each controlled 5-6 red teams. Each team 
had three individual entities. The red cell could move their teams anywhere and employ any 
tactics to achieve their objectives or thwart the friendly objectives. Also, the red cell was not told 
if they were playing a benchmark game (against the human staff) or a test game (against the 
RAID system). Exit interviews with the red cell confirmed that they were not able to discern 
whether their opponent was human or software. 
Planning and overall control of friendly forces was performed by a blue command cell, as 
depicted in Figure 2. However, control of the actual friendly team entities in the simulation was 
by a blue cell of 4 humans who received their plans, directions and commands from the blue 
commander. The blue commander used the predictions and recommendations from the RAID 
system or his “staff” to develop the course of action. For the Phase 1 experiments, the battle was 
paused every 15 minutes and the commander received an updated set of predictions and 
recommendations. Throughout each game, the commander was free to request new updates, as 
desired, and could alter his course of action at will. The blue commander was rotated for various 
scenarios, but the same commander was used for both the benchmark and the test game of each 
paired set of runs. To guard against learning, the paired games were separated by several days; 
Blue Cell
2 personnel
w/ RAID
Blue Cell
4 personnel w/o RAID
Red Cell
4 personnel
Commands
agile and 
aggressive
Red Force
Data collection and analysis cell (2 personnel)
computes scores and predictive accuracy w/ and w/o RAID
Control Cell (3 personnel)
enforces realism and integrity of the wargame
Commands
Situation
Commands
Situation
RAID
Experiment
Switch
1 perso
5
5
 
Figure 2. Experiment Setup. 
This shows the physical setup for the experiments, with a Blue command cell, a 
Red cell playing the enemy forces, a White cell ensuring integrity of the wargames 
and paired runs, and a data collection cell gathering metrics and other information. 
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sometimes the benchmark version was played first and sometimes the test version was played 
first. In either case the commander was not told or reminded whether he was playing the first or 
second half of the pair of games. Great care was taken to ensure the integrity of the paired games 
and during both Phase I experiments a few pairs were thrown out due to contamination of the 
process. 
As part of the white cell control process, both the red and blue commander provided the 
white cell with a general overview of their planned course of action for a given scenario after 
they had a chance to review the initial laydown of forces and were given their mission 
objectives. Certain red teams were assigned emotions to play and were required to log the actions 
they took to represent those emotions. This provided the data collectors with ground truth 
regarding the emotional states that might be identified during the battle. Finally, all 
communications were monitored to ensure the integrity of the wargames. 
 
Experimental Scenarios 
 
Scenarios for the experiments were focused on an urban terrain with a largely dismounted 
Blue Force operating against an insurgent-like irregular dismounted Red Force. The scenarios 
were inspired by recent military engagements in Mogadishu, Najaf, Fallujah, and other urban 
battles. The situations emulated included the defense of friendly government facilities, the rescue 
of downed aircrew, the capture of an insurgent leader, the rescue of hostages or the reaction to an 
attack on a friendly patrol. For operational simplicity, only a few basic mission types were used 
to build the scenarios for the experiments. The three basic mission types were Point/Area Attack 
(blue forces attack a specific target or area, Point/Area Defense (blue forces protect specific 
buildings and clear all enemy forces from a specific area) and Withdrawal (congregate all blue 
forces at a designated location). Figure 3 illustrates a typical starting laydown of forces for a 
Point Defense scenario where friendly forces are tasked to protect the four buildings highlighted 
in the center. The enemy’s objective was to attack any number of those four facilities to inflict 
Figure 3. Example of Point Defense Mission. 
In a point defense mission, Blue Forces were tasked to protect specified buildings 
from attack. The operational score was influenced by how quickly the blue forces 
reached the  objective buildings and how well they protected them. 
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casualties and damage. In this type of scenario, blue forces would need to move as quickly as 
possible into defensive positions around the designated buildings. As can be seen, some enemy 
forces are initially closer to the buildings of interest and could cause damage and casualties while 
blue forces were enroute. The operational scoring for the point defense mission was greatly 
influenced by how quickly blue forces were in place around the designated buildings and how 
much (how little) fire the buildings received from the red forces. As an example of the free play 
exercised by the red forces, sometimes they attacked all the target buildings, and sometimes they 
focused their efforts on only one or two. Likewise, the blue commander would typically try to 
protect all the buildings, but would occasionally sacrifice (leave unprotected) a single building to 
better protect the remaining buildings. 
For the experiments discussed in this report, the scenarios also contained the following 
characteristics: 
a. the friendly forces were comprised of 18 teams (each w/4 dismounts armed with M-
16s) and 5 Strykers (armored attack vehicles). For battle control purposes, the 18 
teams were organized as 3 platoons of 6 teams each with one simulation operator 
controlling each platoon.  The Strykers were assigned to platoons, but were controlled 
by a Stryker operator, not the platoon operator.; 
b. the enemy forces consisted of 20 teams (each w/3 dismounts armed with AK-47s and 
one rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launcher). The RPGs were effective against the 
Strykers, but the AK-47s were not. Also, red forces were given slightly faster 
movement speeds due to their “familiarity” with the terrain.; 
c. the battle area was a 2 kilometer (Km) by 2 Km region of an urban city with multi-
story buildings (floors, doors, and windows were played in the simulation). Each 
game was played within a 1 Km by 1 Km section of the larger battle area.;  
d. the scenarios were designed to take about two hours to complete the mission. Some of 
the scenarios were designed with two sequential missions, such as rescue a downed 
aircrew and then withdraw to a specified rally point.; and 
e. for Phase I experiments only, full Intelligence was known to both sides with regard to 
location, strength, and movement of all forces (much like a chess game). This 
artificiality was used to prove that full knowledge of the battlespace (e.g. 
overwhelming intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) resources) is not 
sufficient to guarantee success in battle and it made helped reduce some of the 
complexity for the immature, evolving technologies. In subsequent phases, both the 
initial Intelligence of the distribution of forces will be greatly diminished (to 
approximately 25%) and the ongoing updates during the execution of the simulation 
will be severely constrained to more accurately replicate real world conditions. 
The experimental scenarios and methodology have been setup to provide sufficient 
military relevance to prove the value of the technology to a military audience and designed with 
sufficient complexity to prove that the technology can handle the extraordinary complexity of 
real world battles. To reiterate, the experiments were not been setup to replicate any current or 
future command and control (C2) or intelligence process, structure, or organization, but have 
been designed to measure the accuracy, timeliness, and value of the predictions and 
recommendations of the RAID system as compared to what a group of highly experienced 
humans could do with the same information. The next section of this report discusses the output 
products produced by the RAID system. 
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Predictions and Recommendations 
 
 The main focus of the RAID system is to make predictions about enemy actions, to 
include goals, deceptions, actions, movements, and positions. In the classic military move—
countermove—counter-countermove planning and analysis, the RAID system makes 
assumptions or recommendations about friendly plans and behaviors to accurately predict the 
enemy. In formulating the predictions, the ARM takes into account such factors as the high-level 
objectives, intents and preferences of the friendly and enemy commanders, physical capabilities 
and needs of the assets available to both sides, mutual influence of actions of blue and red forces, 
terrain, non-combatants, cultural and doctrinal aspects, psychological factors affecting troops and 
commanders, prior evolution of the operation, etc. With this input information, the ARM 
generates a detailed prediction looking forward anywhere from 0 to 300 minutes (as specified by 
the user) from the current moment, including a sequence of actions (situated in time and space) 
to be performed by the enemy force.  During Phase I, the RAID system only made predictions up 
to 30 minutes into the future.  
Because the actions of red and blue forces are closely connected and influence each 
other, the ARM must also generate its estimates of the friendly actions similar to the predictions 
of enemy actions. These can be seen as assumptions or recommendations regarding the friendly 
course of action. Although the primary function of RAID is to anticipate red actions, the 
capability to suggest friendly actions is a natural, valuable byproduct that can be effectively used 
by the commander via an integrated command and control/intelligence system. As an integral 
part of the RAID predictive process, the DRM infers possible concealed enemy force elements or 
movements of elements, incorrectly identified enemy assets, decoys, actions designed to mislead 
friendly forces, etc. by continually observing the evolution of the battlefield and the evolution of 
the predictions made by the ARM. Since there were no concealed forces during the Phase I 
experiments, the DRM only made predictions about potential feints or misdirections attempted 
by the enemy. 
 
Estimation of Enemy Goals and Attitudes 
 
One portion of the ARM has been designed to 
explicitly handle the “human” aspects of battlefield 
behaviors with a cognitive model (Bayesian belief net) 
that propagates relations between actions, emotions, 
goals, desires and dispositions. Specifically, this sub-
component captures the implicit cultural and doctrinal 
preferences and then connects the observed behaviors 
with an estimated mental state. The projected mental 
state is then mapped into probable incipient goals. As 
the enemy takes actions and moves about the 
battlefield, a pheromone-analogy algorithm fits these 
current behaviors to past behaviors and prunes and 
clarifies its model of the mental state of the enemy. 
Finally, this sub-component projects future “broad-
brush” physical behaviors and mental state evolution by exploring multiple potential roll-outs of 
actions and events using a concept of ghost agents or avatars [4,5,6,7,8]. 
Figure 4. Cognitive Predictions. 
The ARM can predict the goals and 
attitude (emotional state) of the enemy. 
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 Figure 4 illustrates a few of the predictions made by this sub-component of the ARM. 
Predictions of emotional states were displayed as ‘alerts’ as they were identified. Identification 
of the emotional state of an enemy unit (team) can be beneficial to the commander in 
determining if that enemy team is an actual threat that needs to be countered or merely a 
nuisance that needs to be monitored. The prediction of enemy goals helps the commander to 
understand the prediction of enemy movement. In this example, the enemy is predicted to 
‘defend in place’ with an accompanying movement prediction that the enemy will not advance, 
but will be in a defensive posture. Finally, the prediction of ‘foreign fighter’ will give the 
commander a sense of the motivation and zeal of that enemy team as well as possible insight into 
the potential skill level or lethality of that team. For example, during one mission the RAID 
system identified a “cowardly” fireteam on the flank of the blue forces. Using that prediction, the 
commander chose not to reinforce his flank and to continue his forward motion to the objective. 
As predicted, the enemy fireteam never 
attacked the exposed flank of the blue 
force. During the second Phase I 
experiment, the human staff was asked to 
identify the demoralized or unenthusiastic 
enemy fireteams and report them as soon 
as they were identified. Figure 5 compares 
the detection/predictions from RAID 
versus the human staff. In general, the 
human staff and the RAID system 
identified the same “emotional” fireteams, 
but the RAID system consistently made 
the identification 10-15 minutes sooner 
than the human staff. The faster 
identification times could make a 
difference in the tactical strategies 
employed and ultimate outcome of the 
engagement. 
 
Identification of Enemy Deceptions 
 
  The DRM is responsible for identifying probable enemy deceptions, decoys, feints, and 
concealed enemy assets, movements and actions within the currently available information. It 
employs multiple technologies, such as: a deception robustness estimator that applies stochastic 
game theory to state estimation to discern underlying deception strategies [9,10,11,12]; a 
deception cost/value evaluation which combines consideration of observations, cost for Red to 
deceive, and value to Red if deception works; a risk-sensitive theory for recognition and analysis 
of deception potentials and likelihoods; and non-symmetric evaluation functions that produce 
value functions, initially through SME heuristics, then through automated learning. 
 Figure 6 illustrates a ‘Feint’ alert displayed by the DRM component during the Phase I 
experiments. Due to the full information state, there were no hidden forces or concealed 
movements for the DRM to predict, so feints were the only information predicted by the DRM. 
During the Phase I experiments, the Red cell knowingly attempted nine feints. The RAID system 
Figure 5. Prediction of Enemy Emotions. 
The RAID system and the human staff were able 
to detect and predict the same set of “emotional” 
enemy fireteams, but the RAID system made the 
identification 10-15 minutes faster than the staff. 
Battle time (%)
RAID
Number of Units  
Detected 
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identified four and the human staff identified three (see Figure 7). Although this is not a 
statistically significant difference, it is encouraging that software was able to discern such a 
subtle behavior anomaly. In the next phase of development, the DRM will be exercised fully 
with limited information about an enemy that can easily conceal its assets, movements, and 
actions. Also, the prediction of enemy locations by the DRM will become a necessary and 
important input to the ARM component. 
 
 
Anticipation of Enemy Movements 
 
The other sub-component of the ARM 
predicts enemy movements and recommends 
friendly courses of action to best counter the 
enemy. This prediction technique employs an 
efficient abstraction (known as Linguistic 
Geometry)[13,14] of the action space for a 
non-zero-sum game solution. This technology 
uses a small number of general-purpose 
heuristics to guide a fast, low-branching 
search routine, then generates multiple 
worldviews to reflect the partial observability 
of Red and Blue, and finally provides a means 
to view the predictions and recommendations 
in both 2D and 3D as an animation over the 
prediction time window. Figure 8 illustrates a 
snapshot from both views. The red lines 
represent predicted moves by the enemy 
forces and the blue lines are the recommended 
moves for the friendly forces. The illustration also shows where engagements (fire fights) are 
likely to occur and the 3D version can even show forces using upper floors and even rooftops for 
Figure 7.  Feint Prediction. 
RAID was able to detect and identify a higher 
percentage of enemy feints than the human staff. 
Figure 6. Deception Prediction 
The DRM predicts a feint at this 
location during the Phase I experiments. 
Figure 8. Prediction of Enemy Movements. 
The left side is a 2D presentation of the predicted 
moves and the right side is a 3D version.  Also 
shown are the recommended blue movements 
and the predicted engagement zones. 
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better coverage and fields of fire. The animation adds timing information to the predictions to 
allow a commander to see and understand the predicted sequence of movements and to better 
understand the necessary synchronization of his own troop movement. The 3D view also helped 
commanders appreciate the line-of-sight parameters of the battlefield, especially since the 
simulation terrain was not flat and allowed interesting line-of-sight opportunities. 
In this area of movement predictions, the RAID system performed significantly better 
than the human staff (see Figure 9). On average, the distance error for the human predictions was 
twice the distance error for the RAID predictions. Both humans and the RAID system made 
better predictions as the battle progressed and end objectives (destinations) and initial movement 
directions became visible. For some games, the RAID system was able to correctly predict the 
movement of 19 of the 20 enemy fireteams within one building – meaning a fireteam went 
around a building on one side and RAID predicted the other side. 
 
Overall Battle Outcome 
 
In addition to comparing the component level products of the RAID system with human 
experts, each game was scored using operational metrics to measure the success of the blue 
force, i.e. command effectiveness. The blue force command effectiveness was measured by: the 
rate of progress toward the mission accomplishment (e.g., advancing to or clearing the specified 
objective); the number of red personnel killed; and the avoidance of friendly losses and collateral 
casualties. Success of the red force was measured by delay of the blue force and causing blue 
casualties. To ensure that RAID supported runs truly represented the RAID predictions and 
recommendations, the blue commanders had to follow the general recommendations provided by 
RAID and deviate only as needed to implement the desired actions. Elements of the weighted 
Error 
in 
Meters 
Human 
staff 
RAID 
% of wargame time
Figure 9. Accuracy of Predicted Enemy Locations 
This is a sampling of the error (in meters) of the predicted enemy locations.  
Generally, RAID performed significantly better than the human staff. 
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scoring algorithm are shown in Figure 10. The 
weightings were tuned for the various mission 
types and reviewed by operational experts to verify 
the appropriateness of the values. Values were 
measured in real-time during the experiment runs 
and the Control Cell and Data Collection Cell were 
able to correlate value changes with scenario 
events for post-run analysis.  
The chart in Figure 11 shows the outcome 
of the RAID supported runs versus the human 
supported runs in the second experiment.  Similar 
values were obtained for the first experiment as 
well. Each symbol represents a paired run (where 
the mission and initial laydown of enemy and 
friendly forces were identical) with the RAID 
score on the vertical axis and the human score on 
the horizontal axis. Symbols that lie above the 
diagonal line are pairs where RAID had a higher 
score. In both Phase I experiments, the RAID 
supported runs had a higher average score than the 
human supported runs.  For the nine paired runs, the RAID system had an average score of 75.5 
and the human staff had an average of 72.3 with a standard deviation of 10 points. The statistical 
significance of the values was 81%. In exit interviews with the Blue commanders, their 
command effectiveness was better with RAID due to both more accurate predictions of enemy 
movements and details about the blue course of action that helped to convey the importance of 
timing and synchronization. 
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 The experimental results are intriguing and encouraging. To think that a computer system 
can “read the mind of the enemy” and make meaningful and correct predictions about the 
Figure 10. Measurement of Command 
Effectiveness. 
This is a display of the weighted measures 
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score for each run. 
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This figure shows the paired 
values of nine experiment run 
pairs, clearly indicating that the 
RAID supported runs had a 
higher average 
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enemy’s likely goals, deceptions, actions, and movements is quite an accomplishment. To be 
able to do this in real-time against an intelligent, live enemy is almost unheard of. Exit interviews 
with the human staff and human players indicate that the RAID system does a better job of 
evaluating the entire battlefield and is not distracted by singular events. The RAID system did 
not forget, did not overlook, and kept track of all fireteams, which allowed it to make better 
predictions and recommendations. Also, the products produced by the RAID system provided a 
clearer understanding of the enemy, the enemy’s most likely actions, and the most appropriate 
friendly counter-moves. 
The RAID program is being conducted in three 12-month phases.  
a. Phase I – Adversarial Anticipation and Counteraction focused on mechanisms to 
compute and anticipate adversarial, move-countermove actions. Phase I is complete. 
b. Phase II – Adversarial Reasoning about Concealment and Deception will focus on the 
ability to see through the fog of war and recognize deceptions.  
c. Phase III - Integration and Transition to the Army’s Distributed Common  
Ground System (DCGS-A)  will develop fieldable products which can integrate with 
existing C2 and ISR systems. 
The major change for Phase II experiments will be the elimination of full knowledge of 
the battlespace. Both enemy and blue forces will have limited initial knowledge of each other 
and will have limited “sensor” capabilities to learn about the opposing forces. Complexity will 
also be increased by adding more forces, more weapon types, a larger play area, communication 
delays, and other factors which add to the realism of the simulation environment. Additionally, 
measurement techniques are being added to the Phase II experiments to try and ascertain “why” 
the RAID system is able to do better. Phase II experiments will be conducted at the Army’s 
Battle Command BattleLabs (Fort Huachuca and Fort Leavenworth) and will use active duty 
personnel as the blue staff.  
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